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Drawing on evidence from developing country studies, this paper considers several key issues. We discuss 
the impact of minimum wages in the developing world based on a selection of recent studies and highlight 
non-compliance with minimum wage laws as an important research and policy issue. We then briefly re-
view the existing empirical evidence on non-compliance, which reveals relatively high levels of violation 
in the cases for which data are available.  Reflecting on this evidence we have suggested a new Index of 
Violation to measure absolute and relative levels of minimum wage violation. Arguably such a measure 
is a potentially powerful policy tool for guiding where enforcement resources need to be channelled. Yet 
we also understand very little about the various factors which impact on violation of the minimum wage. 
We identify individual, institutional, firm and local labour market characteristics as a composite set of 
dependent variables, which may explain non-compliance with the law. While the evidence is scant, it does 
support the notion that these factors are critical as ‘inputs’ in understanding the ‘output’ of minimum 
wage violation.  Based on the assembled evidence, a comparison of policy approaches regarding enforce-
ment are discussed – with a view to suggesting an optimal policy intervention matrix for minimum wage 
enforcement in developing countries.
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assistance with this paper.  
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Legislated minimum wages now exist in almost all develop-
ing countries around the world, and there is a growing em-
pirical literature which examines the impacts of this policy 
intervention. Much of the literature focuses on the extent to 
which regulation affects employment and wages, revealing 
that while there are generalizable lessons, the successful use 
of minimum wage laws as a tool for social protection often 
depends on a range of factors specific to each labour mar-
ket. Crucial to any work on minimum wages in the devel-
oping world, however, is the fact that most formal enforce-
ment mechanisms are weak and relatively high levels of 
non-compliance with labour regulations are commonplace. 
The existence of widespread non-compliance has impor-
tant implications for policy makers and researchers. Until 
very recently, the issue of violation or non-compliance has 
received relatively little policy attention and is often over-
looked in studies that try to assess the impact of minimum 
wage laws. Indeed, for ease of analysis much of the litera-
ture implicitly assumes that minimum wage laws are ade-
quately or perfectly enforced. Nonetheless it is increasingly 
clear from recent work that while there has been a growth 
in regulatory regimes attempting to protect workers from 
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I Introduction
exploitation, there remains a substantial gap between legal 
stipulations and their actual outcomes in most developing 
country labour markets. As a consequence then, enforce-
ment remains central to debate over the impact of minimum 
wages, and labour regulation more generally. Confining it-
self to minimum wage legislation, this paper reviews the 
emergent research on enforcement and compliance in the 
developing world. 
Well-known studies on the impact of minimum wages in the 
United States were the first to suggest that the theoretical 
wage-employment trade-off does not always hold in prac-
tice: An increase in the minimum wage is not always synon-
ymous with a decrease in employment2.  The ensuing work 
focused on developing countries has shown that the impact 
of introducing, or increasing, a minimum wage can have 
mixed impacts, with studies providing evidence of negative 
employment effects in some cases but also evidence of no 
significant declines in employment in others. For instance, a 
study by Lemos (2006) found that minimum wages in Brazil 
had no significant effect on either formal or informal em-
ployment. At the same time the minimum wage in Vietnam 
has been shown to have had an insignificant impact on over-
all employment but a significant negative employment effect 
in the formal sector, where workers who lost their jobs se-
cured employment in the informal sector instead (Nguyen, 
2010). The Vietnamese study concluded that attention to 
low wage workers in the formal sector was needed in order 
to protect them from the negative impacts of the minimum 
wage. Maloney and Nuñez (2003) found negative employ-
ment effects resulting from minimum wage increases in Co-
lumbia, as did a recent study by Bhorat, Kanbur, and Stanwix 
(2012) on minimum wage laws in the South African Agricul-
tural sector. Notably, in the South African case, no employ-
ment decreases were found for other minimum wage sec-
tors, including the Retail, Domestic work, Forestry, Security 
and Taxi sectors (Bhorat, Kanbur, and Mayet, 2013a). 
This heterogeneity of outcomes suggests that particularly 
when there is imperfect enforcement, that is, both compli-
ant and non-compliant employers are present in a labour 
market, the employment effects of a minimum wage hike 
are unpredictable; a result for which Basu, Chau, and Kan-
bur (2009) provide a theoretical basis. In most cases the 
question of impact is one which requires careful empirical 
investigation both at the country and sectoral level.  In the 
developing country context the levels of compliance should 
therfore not be overlooked.
 
II The Impact of Minimum Wages
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While there is no general consensus on the impact that 
minimum wage laws will have on a specific labour market, 
the literature does achieve some consensus on the current 
state of enforcement (and compliance) with minimum wage 
laws in the developing world. It is generally accepted that 
enforcement and compliance in most developing countries 
is low. The small but growing literature shows that formal 
enforcement efforts are weak and a substantial portion of 
workers still receive sub-minimum wages (Ronconi, 2008; 
Gindling, Mossadd & Trejos, 2013; Basu, Chau, and Kanbur, 
2009; ILO, 2008). Moreover, the main reason for this is not 
a lack of the required legislative frameworks. Indeed Pi-
ore and Schrank (2008) emphasise the ‘regulatory revival’ 
that has taken place across the developing world and many 
countries now have an extensive web of labour regulations 
which include minimum wage laws. In some cases regulato-
ry frameworks are so detailed that countries have multiple 
minimum wages that differ across sectors. This is the case 
in Kenya and Costa Rica, as well as in South Africa where 
statutory minimum wages vary not only by sector but in cer-
tain cases by occupation and location, resulting in over 36 
different wage minima (Grindling and Terrel, 2004; Andalón 
and Pagés, 2008). Thus, as Ronconi (2008) points out, it is 
generally not the lack of labour regulation in these countries 
that is of concern, but rather a lack of compliance with exist-
ing regulations due to imperfect enforcement. 
Several recent studies provide empirical evidence on com-
pliance levels and reveal that a large proportion of workers 
in developing countries earn wages below the legal mini-
mum. For example, in Argentina, only half of the workforce 
receives legally mandated benefits, which includes wag-
es above the legal minimum, hours worked below the le-
gal maximum, and compensation for work related injuries 
(Ronconi, 2008). In Kenya, Andalón and Pagés (2008) report 
that minimum wage non-compliance rates soar to nearly 70 
percent in higher skilled occupations in urban areas. The 
authors partly attribute lack of compliance to the many 
categories of minimum wages which make compliance and 
enforcement more difficult. In South Africa, Bhorat, Kanbur, 
and Mayet (2012a) estimate that just under half of the work-
force received wages below the legal minimum, but there 
was large sectoral variation within this. A range of other 
studies find similarly high levels of non-compliance in de-
veloping countries such as Trinidad and Tobago (Strobl and 
Walsh, 2001), Brazil (Lemos, 2006), Chile (Kanbur, Ronco-
ni and Wedenoja, 2013) and several other Latin American 
countries (Maloney and Nuñez, 2003; Gindling, Mossadd & 
Trejos, 2013). However, not all developing countries have 
such high levels of non-compliance. In Vietnam, for example, 
just over three percent of formal and private sector work-
ers earned sub-minimum wages in 2006, and the estimate is 
slightly higher for public and informal sectors, at 4.2 and 6.8 
percent, respectively (Nguyen, 2010). 
III Minimum Wage Non-Compliance: Evidence for Developing  
 Countries
2  The seminal work being Card and Krueger (1994); see Nuemark and Wascher (2007) for a detailed discussion of the literature.
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A practical issue that concerns work on enforcement and 
compliance is one of measurement, and in particular how to 
calculate non-compliance rates. In general non-compliance 
is simply measured as the percentage of workers in a coun-
try who are paid below the appropriate minimum wage. 
However, this is a fairly blunt measure as it does not provide 
an estimate of the extent of the underpayment. Therefore, 
workers earning fractionally less than the legislated mini-
mum are equated with cases where there are gross viola-
tions of the minimum wage law. A paper by Bhorat, Kanbur 
and Mayet (2013b) develops a convenient method for meas-
uring non-compliance that solves this problem. The authors 
apply the well-known Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) pover-
ty measurement technique3  to minimum wage analysis and 
so create an Index of Violation. Table 1, below, shows how 
the index is applied to measure non-compliance in Chile; 
where, for example, in 2009 15.3 percent of workers earned 
sub-minimum wages. The index not only measures the 
standard headcount ratio (V0, or the percentage of workers 
earning below the minimum) but also the depth of violation 
(V1, or the gap between the minimum wage and each work-
er’s wage), and finally the depth of violation squared (V2, a 
measure that weights those at the bottom of the distribution 
more heavily). Additionally, V1/V0 denotes the percentage 
shortfall of the average wage of violated workers from the 
minimum wage. Put differently, violated workers earn on 
average V1/V0 below the minimum wage. 
IIIa A Note on Measuring Non-Compliance
3 The FGT formula is given by: 
where z is the poverty line, N is the total population, H is the number of poor (those with incomes at or below z), y_i are individual incomes 
and α is a sensitivity parameter. 
The index is a valuable tool for subsequent work on compli-
ance as it allows researchers to analyse the level and depth 
of non-compliance. Given the large number of countries for 
which such information remains unknown, this method of 
measurement would also aid policy makers.
For some time economists have been developing models of 
enforcement and compliance in an attempt to understand 
more clearly the incentives facing employers, and the pol-
icy options open to policy makers. Early work in the mini-
mum wage enforcement literature includes Ashenfelter and 
Smith (1979), Grenier (1982), Chang and Erlich (1985), and 
all build on work by Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970) who 
tried to create equilibrium models of law enforcement more 
generally. Essentially this literature views the long term role 
of the law as being a deterrent to potential offenders. Conse-
quently higher penalties and better inspection pave the way 
to greater levels of compliance. The compliance decision of 
every firm is viewed as one of a rational choice in which the 
firm calculates whether they stand to gain more by comply-
ing or violating the minimum wage law. 
In this paradigm a higher probability of being inspected, and 
the application of larger penalties for violation, increase the 
expected cost of non-compliance and thus should induce 
more firms to adhere to the minimum wage law. Where the 
IV Models of Minimum Wage Enforcement
Table 1: Absolute and Relative Compliance in Chile, 1990-2009: An Index of Violation
Notes:  Real minimum wage is calculated using the CPI from the Chilean Central Bank. Average wage is the average hourly wage for prime aged workers 
 (25-55) subject to the minimum wage. 
Source:  Kanbur, Ronconi and Wedenoja (2013).
The Standard Economic Approach
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benefits of underpaying workers exceed the expected costs – 
conditional on the probability of being inspected – firms are 
more likely to violate the law. The policy implications which 
flow from such a model are clear. Governments should in-
crease the costs of violation by increasing the quantity and 
quality of inspections (allocate greater resources to enforce-
ment) and increase the scheduled penalties and fines for 
non-compliance. The benefit of a quantitative cost-benefit 
approach is that it provides a standard measure of the finan-
cial incentives facing the average firm. In this way it gives 
policy makers a basic indication of how effective their ex-
isting enforcement framework is. However, this approach 
does not account for the various non-financial factors in-
fluencing a firm’s compliance decisions which may include: 
the influence of unions, peer-effects, workplace productivity 
effects and so on. Particularly in developing countries the 
reasons for non-compliance are often more complicated 
than a rational financial calculation of the part of employers. 
There are also a range of policy choices that can influence 
compliance, in addition to inspection and penalties, which 
the standard model of compliance cannot cope with.  We 
attempt to cover some of these omissions in what follows 
below.
V The Impact of Enforcement on Non-Compliance: Early  
 Evidence
There have been several studies that measure the levels of 
noncompliance in various developing countries but only a 
small number of these provide empirical evidence on the 
causal effect that existing enforcement efforts have on com-
pliance. The question of how enforcement efforts influence 
compliance is crucial for policymakers, and there are two 
likely explanations for the dearth of work exploring this 
causal link. Firstly, data on enforcement and compliance is 
scarce and finding appropriate measures for both enforce-
ment and compliance is problematic, as Ronconi (2010) 
points out. Secondly, there is a problem of endogeneity due 
to the potentially simultaneous relationship between en-
forcement and compliance, which makes any causal analy-
sis difficult. Enforcement is likely to increase compliance as 
firms are more likely to comply if their probability of being 
caught is higher, but at the same time a government agency 
is likely to increase the number of inspectors or enforcement 
resources in response to low compliance levels. The difficul-
ty of trying to disentangle the effect of enforcement on com-
pliance is clear. To date, the preferred proxy for measuring 
enforcement is the number of labour inspectors per coun-
try (or region), which is useful as an aggregate measure but 
An Alternative Approach
An alternative strand of literature that is smaller in size but 
perhaps broader in scope, moves away from a focus on the 
financial incentives of individual employers and studies the 
different institutional structures that shape enforcement 
efforts, including the role of labour inspectors and the dif-
ferent approaches to compliance. Much of this work draws 
on insights from sociology and institutional economics, with 
important contributions from Oliver (1980), Bardach & Ka-
gan (1982), Ayres & Braithwaite (1992), Hawkins (2002), 
Piore & Schrank (2008), Pires (2008) and Piore (2010). 
Central to this literature is the idea that effective enforce-
ment must take country-specific factors into account. Piore 
and Schrank (2008) identify and characterise two different 
‘styles’ of minimum wage enforcement that apply in differ-
ent contexts and assess the applicability of each, with a par-
ticular focus on the developing world. 
The authors characterise a ‘Latin’ model and an ‘Anglo-Amer-
ican’ model of enforcement as two distinct approaches to 
the problem of enforcement and non-compliance. The An-
glo-American approach to enforcement, identified most 
clearly in North America, views non-compliance as the re-
sult of rational, utility-maximising calculations by individual 
firms and thus adopts a punitive approach to violations in 
order to encourage compliance. This is the axiomatic mod-
el adopted by most economists in the literature described 
above, where penalties and deterrence are the key policy le-
vers. Within this approach, labour inspectors generally have 
very little leeway when faced with a case of non-compliance; 
they are expected to simply enforce the law. If an employer 
violates the law they are fined accordingly.  The appeal of 
this approach for policymakers is that it generally requires 
a less-skilled inspectorate and it limits the potential for 
corruption and bribery. However, the concern is that in de-
veloping countries a strict punitive approach risks driving 
emerging firms into the informal sector and potentially has 
significant disemployment effects. 
The Latin model, on the other hand, is an approach applied 
in many Latin American countries where enforcement agen-
cies tend to treat non-compliance as less of a ‘calculated firm 
decision’ but rather as an outcome resulting from a range 
of possible factors, including limited capabilities on the part 
of the employer. Here the response to non-compliance takes 
on a more “conciliatory and tutelary” approach, aiming to 
assist non-compliant firms to become compliant over time 
(Piore and Schrank, 2008:5). In the Latin model inspectors 
are generally charged with a broader mandate of improving 
compliance levels, rather than enforcing a law, and are giv-
en more freedom to approach each situation differently in 
order to achieve this. This approach requires skilled inspec-
tors who have a comprehensive knowledge of the various la-
bour laws and can weigh up infringements on a case-by-case 
basis. It also faces greater risks of bribery and corruption on 
the part of inspectors. Nonetheless, the Latin approach can 
allow for a more effective evolution toward compliance over 
time, encouraging sustainable compliance without hurting 
employment or overburdening new firms. In practice, how-
ever, most countries apply some combination of the Anglo 
and Latin approaches to enforcement, and while careful 
planning of enforcement strategies is necessary, it is often a 
lack of skills and resources that tend to dictate enforcement 
policy. 
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struggles to overcome the problem of endogeneity, in the 
absence of appropriate instruments. 
The recent literature on enforcement has focused on deter-
mining the various factors that are influencing compliance 
(or non-compliance) in developing countries. This approach 
can be loosely framed as the ‘determinants of violation’ ap-
proach from which several basic insights have emanated. 
Ronconi’s (2008) study on Argentina constitutes one of the 
first attempts to empirically estimate the effect of govern-
ment enforcement efforts on compliance in a developing 
country. The study uses the number of labour inspectors 
working in provincial public enforcement agencies as a 
proxy for enforcement activity and finds that the intensity 
of enforcement is a significant determinant of adherence to 
the law. Ronconi (2008) shows that a higher concentration 
of inspectors is correlated with increased fines for violation 
and suggests that this is one channel through which enforce-
ment effectively influences compliance. 
Another study which also uses the number of labour inspec-
tors as a measure of the intensity of enforcement is that of 
Bhorat, Kanbur, and Mayet (2012a) on South Africa. Accord-
ing to their results, however, the impact of the number of 
labour inspectors on compliance was insignificant and the 
level at which the minimum wage was set had more marked 
effects. Despite this, in both the Argentinean and the South 
African studies, local labour market characteristics (nota-
bly the unemployment rate) were found to have a signif-
icant impact on enforcement, where a higher unemploy-
ment rate was associated with lower levels of compliance. 
A cross-country study by Almeida and Ronconi (2012) pre-
sents a series of stylised facts on the incidence of enforce-
ment, showing that in addition to labour market character-
istics, other factors such as firm size, the skill-level of the 
workforce, and the degree of product market power can all 
influence the likelihood of being inspected and as a result, 
the incentives to comply.  Gindling, Mossadd and Trejos 
(2013) find that a state programme to increase compliance 
with minimum wages in Costa Rica, increased average wag-
es and complaince levels – with no significantly negative im-
pact on employment.  Almeida & Carneiro (2011)  find that 
increase enforcement in a sample of cities in Brazil, raised 
the level of formal employment, reduced self-employment 
levels and reduce wage inequality.  Finally, Almeida & Susan-
li (2012) and Almeida & Carneiro (2009) show that firing 
and other labour market regulations, when stringently ap-
plied, reduced average employment in firms. 
Based on this emergent literature, we could argue that there 
are four composite sets of variables which remain important 
in understanding the various factors shaping and influenc-
ing minimum wage violation in the developing world. There 
are firstly, institutional factors such as the penalty structure 
for non-compliance, the number of minimum wage sched-
ules in an economy, the resources allocated to enforcement 
services, and the existence of awareness campaigns. All play 
a role in shaping the levels of violation, but their importance 
will vary based on the specific country and labour market 
context. Secondly, the individual characteristics of inspec-
tors, including their level of education, gender and expe-
rience, can influence the extent to which they are effective 
at achieving compliance. Thirdly, firm characteristics such 
as the size of the firm, the distance from the enforcement 
agency, the number of previous violations, and the level of 
foreign ownership, would again to varying degrees impact 
on the observed levels of enforcement and violation in an 
economy. Finally, local labour market characteristics such 
as the unemployment rate, the average wage rate relative to 
the minimum wage, and the levels of unionisation also play 
a role. For the research community there is still much work 
to be done on these four sets of variables; we need improved 
descriptive and econometric work which generates a com-
prehensive set of stylised facts to explain the various factors 
influencing firms’ compliance decisions, and the relative im-
portance of each. Further than this, the challenge is to gath-
er these different variables into some sort of a production 
function approach which estimates the impact of these var-
ious input variables noted above, on non-compliance levels 
within an economy.
VI  Towards an Optimal Enforcement Policy
There are two initial decisions facing policymakers: First-
ly, to set the level of the minimum wage, and secondly, to 
choose the intensity of enforcement. Setting the minimum 
wage should balance potential wage gains against the risks 
of decreasing employment, while taking account of the ex-
tent to which wage laws can be enforced. Evidence shows 
that minimum wages in developing countries tend to be set 
fairly high relative to the median wage in several sectors, 
and often they are set above the median wage for unskilled 
workers. Andalón and Pagés (2008) find that minimum 
wages in Kenya are set high relative to the median wage 
(above 70 percent of the median wage in salaried employ-
ment) and thus non-compliance levels in the country are 
also high. Interestingly, sectors and occupations with a high 
Kaitz index4  are also found to have a higher percentage of 
non-compliance and vice versa (Andalón and Pagés, 2008). 
Bhorat, Kanbur, and Mayet (2012b) find similar results for 
South Africa. High minimum wages paired with lax enforce-
ment may engender high levels of non-compliance in many 
developing countries. 
Regarding enforcement policy, while many factors which 
influence compliance are beyond the policy control of gov-
ernment, the state can influence the intensity and structure 
of formal enforcement efforts. For example, more labour in-
spectors could be allocated to sectors and areas where com-
pliance rates are lowest. However, as noted above, increas-
ing the size of the inspectorate may not always increase 
4 The Kaitz ratio is estimated as the ratio of the mean minimum wage relative to the median wage in each sector-occupation-location 
group.
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compliance, and the style of enforcement should be aligned 
with overall policy goals (Bhorat, Kanbur, and Mayet, 2012b; 
Piore and Schrank, 2008). Other issues such as the penalty 
structure and the level of education of inspectors are also 
important policy choices. However, it must be noted that in 
developing countries effective enforcement is often over-
whlemingly a problem of a lack of resources and inadequate 
skills (ILO, 2005). 
Reports from the ILO suggest that a simple minimum wage 
system contributes to greater levels of enforcement, where 
the setting of wage schedules should be commensurate with 
resource availability (ILO, 2009). Benassi (2011) offers a 
number of key insights from different enforcement strat-
egies and regimes across the globe. The author suggests 
that public campaigns can be used to build support for, and 
knowledge of, minimum wage laws, and in this way encour-
age employers to comply voluntarily. To supplement this, 
capacity building measures such as information sessions 
and training seminars can help to inform and equip both 
employers and workers. This takes into account the obser-
vation from Piore and Schrank (2008) that in many cases 
developing country employers violate the law due to lack of 
knowledge or weak capacity to implement changes. Naming 
and shaming those who violate the law can also be a cheap 
and effective way of encouraging compliance. This has been 
used to some extent in Indonesia (Rama 1996:868) and in 
Brazil a blacklist exists where non-compliant firms can, for 
example, be barred from acquiring credit (Benassi, 2011). 
On the subject of penalties Benassi (2011) contends that 
sanctions should be structured such that they constitute a 
real deterrent to non-compliance. In the economics litera-
ture this means that the cost of sanctions should be high-
er than the benefits (to employers) of underpaying their 
workers. While it should be accepted that in certain cases 
non-compliance is not the result of a rational calculation on 
the part of the employer, there is evidence to suggest that 
clear and focused pecuniary fines do have an effect. In Co-
lumbia, fines for minimum wage violation can be up to 100 
times the minimum wage and in Venezuela, refusal to pay 
workers can even lead to imprisonment.  
A further measure that can improve compliance is a com-
prehensive wage-setting process that includes relevant 
stakeholders and where the level of the minimum wage is 
carefully decided upon. Benassi (2011) also recommends 
that complaint procedures be made accessible to workers 
and their representatives, so that individual workers who 
fear reprisal for taking individual action can appeal to rep-
resentatives that will act of their behalf. In this regard it may 
be important for unions be given access to information on 
workers’ wages where possible. In addition, Benassi (2011) 
notes that a comprehensive monitoring system in which 
regular labour inspections are carried out is vital, especially 
in the sectors at risk. The literature shows that a higher ratio 
of inspectors to workers is generally associated with greater 
levels of compliance over time, as evidence from Brazil in-
dicates, although we do not have sufficient information and 
data to determine the optimal number of inspectors to en-
sure effective compliance (Almeida and Carneiro, 2009:7). 
Finally, public-private partnerships are a possible way to 
help resource-constrained governments encourage compli-
ance. In the Dominican Republic, work by Amengual (2010) 
and Ang et al. (2010) shows how private companies and in 
particular Multinationals that comply with international 
standards, often help improve to compliance levels in both 
up and downstream dealings. 
VII Conclusions
The paper has traversed a range of issues, with a focus on 
minimum wage violation in the developing world. It is evi-
dent though that both the data and the research in this area 
are at a very early stage. Whilst the minimum wage impact 
literature is fairly mature, our understanding of the levels 
of enforcement, the measurement of enforcement, and ul-
timately the determinants of enforcement is still emerging. 
We have reflected here on some of the evidence, and in do-
ing so have suggested a new Index of Violation to measure 
absolute and relative levels of minimum wage violation. Ar-
guably, such a measure is a potentially powerful policy tool 
for guiding where enforcement resources need to be chan-
nelled. Yet we also understand very little about the various 
factors which impact on violation of the minimum wage. We 
identify individual, institutional, firm and local labour mar-
ket characteristics as four sets of variables. While the evi-
dence is scant, it does support the notion that these factors 
are critical as ‘inputs’ in understanding the ‘output’ of min-
imum wage violation. In alluding to new measurement ap-
proaches and early evidence on enforcement, we hope this 
will enrich the engagement between enforcement officials 
and researchers in developing country labour markets. 
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